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Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock:
The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma
of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy*
The Little Rock crisis in  has been accorded major importance in the history
of the civil rights struggle in the United States after . The crisis achieved
its status as a result of its resurrection of several issues that were germane to
the American Civil War and Reconstruction – the conflict between the federal
government  and a Southern state committed to the subjugation of black
Americans; the use of federal armed forces to impose the authority of the
federal government in the South; and the decision taken by a Republican
president to enforce legal provisions safeguarding the rights of blacks in the
face of organized and  determined white supremacist opposition led by a
Southern governor. It also occurred in the wake of the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act with bipartisan support in the Congress – the first civil rights
measure enacted by the federal government since the end of Reconstruction in
 and one that contributed in considerable measure to the tense political
climate in which the Little Rock crisis unfolded. The importance of the Little
Rock crisis assumes even greater weight when one considers the fact that
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. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent
the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and
through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise
of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the s (Baton Rouge, ); Herbert
Brownell,  with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General  Herbert Brownell
(Lawrence, KS, ); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights
(Knoxville, ); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT,
); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville,); and Francis M.
Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, ). For a recent effort to explore the way
in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy
see Mary L. Dudziak, “The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image
of American Democracy,” Southern California Law Review , no.  (): –.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was profoundly ambivalent about the Su-
preme Court’s decision in  to declare segregation unconstitutional, but was
ultimately constrained to use federal forces to apply the law of the land and to
assert the authority of the federal government in Little Rock. Eisenhower’s
ambivalence in  was not singular.
Although the issues embedded in the Little Rock crisis revealed it to be a
chapter of an intrinsically American epic, this paper will explore some other
dimensions of the crisis that would suggest that its importance transcended
American history even as it ultimately helped to reshape American domestic
politics. This study of the Little Rock episode will suggest that the crisis
achieved a global significance by provoking a wider debate about the ethic of
“white supremacy” that underlay segregation in the United States, apartheid
in South Africa, and the colonial order in the non-European world. Further,
this essay argues that the Little Rock crisis served as a catalyst for a major shift
in the course of American engagement with the world outside of Europe. This
is an aspect of the crisis that has hitherto received little attention. Among the
consequences of the crisis for the United States was the opening of American
domestic politics and race relations to international scrutiny and criticism. As
a result, international opinion increasingly became a constituency with which
American policymakers had to contend when responding to the challenge of
racial reform in the United States. In effect, it is possible to argue that the crisis
in Arkansas helps us to rethink assumptions about the relationship between
“national” and “international” history and allows students of American history
to explore the international sources of change in American society and politics.
. In a letter to Swede Hazlett, his boyhood friend, Eisenhower confided that “no other single
event has so disturbed the domestic scene in many years as did the Supreme Court’s decision of
 in the school segregation case. That decision and similar ones earlier and later in point of
time have interpreted the Constitution in such fashion as to put heavier responsibilities than before
on the Federal government in the matter of assuring to each citizen his guaranteed Constitutional
rights.” For the full text of the letter see Robert Griffith, Ike’s Letters to a Friend (Lawrence, KS, ),
–.
. In his memoirs, Eisenhower indicated that since boyhood “I had accepted without qualifica-
tion the right to equality before the law of all citizens of this country, whatever their race or color
or creed.” See Waging Peace, – (New York, ), ; but at a more visceral level, Eisen-
hower’s views revealed the fear of racial mixing that has informed the American weltanschauung.
He confided to Earl Warren that he sympathized with Southerners whose concern “is to see that
their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes.”
Quoted in Stanley I. Kutler, “Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and Desegregation: Some Reflections,” in
Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge, ), .
. For earlier efforts to explore the linkages that race created between non-European nation-
alists and African Americans see Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, “The American Dilemma
in a Changing World: The Rise of Africa and the Negro American,” in The Negro American, ed.
Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (Boston,), –; and Mark Solomon, “Black Critics
of Colonialism and the Cold War,” Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the
Truman Years, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago, ), –. For an interesting overview of race
as a factor in the international relations of the twentieth century see in its entirety Paul Gordon
Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, ).
As its title suggests, the essay draws upon the observation made at the turn
of the century by W. E. B. Du Bois: “The problem of the twentieth century is
the problem of the color line, – the relation of the darker to the lighter races
of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.” The genius
of that insight was Du Bois’s recognition that the politics of race in the United
States could not be divorced from the fate of non-European societies that had
come under the yoke of European and American imperial authority. The Little
Rock crisis was testimony to Du Bois’s perspicacity and helps us to understand
how the politics of race in the United States was an issue that was simultane-
ously domestic and international.
The Little Rock crisis was not the first occasion on which there had been
untoward foreign policy consequences as a result of the politics of race and
segregation in the United States. In the autumn of , several New York hotels
had refused to accommodate the UN delegations of Haiti, Liberia, and Ethio-
pia. As a result, the American Mission to the United Nations had been
constrained to intervene to secure accommodation for these delegations and
had also sought to prevent this situation from being publicized. It was evident
that the presence of African and other black diplomats, with the privileges
associated with diplomatic life, had begun to complicate American domestic
politics. As a consequence, the potentially embarrassing consequences of
segregation was the sword of Damocles that hung over American pretensions
to world leadership after , and the establishment of the headquarters of the
United Nations in New York City ensured that the problem would never really
leave. While the Secretary-General of the UN and the US Mission to the UN
. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Souls of Black Folk,” in  Negro Classics, intro. by John Hope Franklin
(New York, ), .
. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent
theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme
in African-American history see Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American
Response to the Cold War (Albany, ); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S.
Foreign Affairs, – (Chapel Hill, ); William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba’s Race: African
Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, – (Bloomington, ); Elliot P. Skinner, African Americans
and U.S. Policy toward Africa, –: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, ); and Penny
M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, –  (Ithaca, ).
. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in
the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s
Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, ); Cary
Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence,
– (Westport, CT, ); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, ); and,
Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, –
(Columbia, MO, ). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic
politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,”
Stanford Law Review  (): –; and the “Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign
Relations,” Diplomatic History  (Fall ): –.
. Thomas F. Power, Jr., memorandum to Samuel Palma,  June , Records of the Foreign
Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group , United States Mission to the United
Nations, –, box , National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
were able to intervene to resolve the problem in , the issue remained a
festering sore for American diplomacy.
The issue of American race relations, however, was not purely of domestic
concern. Despite the relative success in keeping control over the publication of
incidents involving foreign dignitaries of color, the State Department had a much
more difficult time with a less sympathetic international press and the foreign
coverage of racial problems in the United States. In October , the American
Embassy in France reported widespread condemnation of the verdict in the
Emmett Till case. An all-white jury in Mississippi had acquitted the accused
murderers of Till, a teenager from Chicago who had been killed as a result of his
decision tosolicit theattentionof awhitewomanwithwhomhewasnotacquainted.
According to the embassy, the French press “gave wide coverage to the Till case,
vociferously condemning the verdict. This was true not only of l’Humanite and
Liberation, but of the entire press, right wing and left wing alike.” The embassy in
Bern reported that the Swiss press had expressed similar views about the decision.
In early , the American Embassy in Copenhagen reported that the case
of Autherine Lucy, a young African-American woman seeking admission into
the University of Alabama, was enjoying sympathetic coverage in the Danish
press. The embassy indicated that the administration and students of the two
Danish universities (Copenhagen and Aarhus), with support from a local paper,
had telegraphed their support and sympathy to Miss Lucy. In addition, the
Danish Association for the United Nations and the liberal anti-communist
League for Tolerance had decided to send a joint telegram to Miss Lucy
expressing their sympathy with “[her] efforts for the observance of human
rights and civilization at the University of Alabama.” The president of the
League for Tolerance and the rector of the University of Copenhagen later
telegraphed an offer to register Miss Lucy as a student at the University of
Copenhagen and assured her of financial assistance to complete her studies.
The American official’s report continued with an assessment of the damage
being done to American prestige “from such tragedies as the Emmett Till case
and the unfortunate riots attending Miss Lucy’s efforts.” He criticized the
American press for contributing to the situation and noted that “intensified
efforts of the U.S. press and Government to give a balanced picture in reasonable
perspective will of course help.”
. For a discussion of the increasing scale of the problem in Washington after the accession to
independence by an increasing number of non-European states see Timothy P. Maga, “Battling
the ‘Ugly American’ at Home: The Special Protocol Service and the New Frontier, –,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft , no.  (): –.
. McBride, despatch to the Department of State,  October , General Records of the
Department of State, Record Group , ./-, National Archives II.
. Freimarck despatch to the Department of State,  September , RG , . /-.
. Allen despatch to the Department of State,  February , RG , . /-.
. Ibid.
. Ibid. He closed his dispatch with the comment that “so long as Southern defiance of the
Supreme Court’s decision continues and incidents take place, the Danes can be expected to
Even as the embassy in Copenhagen agonized over the damage done to
American “prestige” by the confrontations over segregation, the reaction from
the State Department was instructive of the mind-set shaping American foreign
policy. Responding to press reports on  February of the offer to Miss Lucy
from the University of Copenhagen and the Danish League for Tolerance,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles personally contacted the embassy indi-
cating that “information available here identifies League as independent anti-
Communist group. Dept regards matter as private non-governmental affair and
plans make no comment. President University Alabama informed foregoing.”
It was obvious that Dulles saw little need to be concerned about foreign
criticism of American race relations.
Despite the administration’s sanguine disregard for Danish sentiment, the
concerns over American racial problems were not restricted to Europeans. The
American consul general in Bombay reported that in the local press there was
extensive coverage of American race relations in both the North and the South.
The consul general advised that “racial discrimination and racial prejudice as
shown in the treatment of Negroes in the United States will probably long
continue to be an important adverse factor in the attitude of the Indian people
toward the United States.” The American consul in Calcutta reported that
press coverage there had also been extensive and critical of developments in
the United States. One example of these critical views was an editorial carried
by the Hindusthan Standard that pointedly argued that support of white su-
premacist ideas did little to strengthen American claims to be a champion of
democracy. The Indian coverage of American politics was also influenced by
the Montgomery bus boycott and its adoption of Mohandas Gandhi’s strategy
of passive resistance that had been used to telling effect in bringing an end to
the British Raj. One Indian correspondent filing a story from New York for the
continue their avid interest and frequently to misread or exaggerate various incidents to the
detriment of U.S. prestige and reputation.”
. Dulles tel. to American Embassy, Copenhagen,  February , RG , . /-.
. Eisenhower himself seemed to display very little concern about the actions of state and
university authorities in Alabama. In a response to letters from citizens writing Eisenhower about
the incident, Maxwell Rabb, the administration’s troubleshooter on issues of race, advised that the
president had expressed his regret about the incident and his hope that “the State and the
University would be able to find a solution.” Since  was a presidential election year, it is not
impossible that Eisenhower sought to avoid any action that would antagonize Southern white
voters and states rights’ advocates on the matter of segregation. In the same letter, Rabb expressed
the view that “the problem at the University of Alabama is not within the jurisdiction of the federal
government and it is indicated that federal intervention in what is essentially a matter of State
concern would undoubtedly be interpreted as a violation of the constitutional rights of the
individual States.” Maxwell M. Rabb to James A. Haljun,  February , Papers of Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Alphabetical File, box , Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
. Turner despatch to the Department of State,  February , RG , . /-.
. Van Hollen depatch to the Department of State,  March , RG , . /-. The
editorial concluded that the “inhumanity of racial arrogance seems to have become the privilege
of certain people with blonde skins. The odd thing is that it finds apologists among U.S. leaders
who want to convert pigmented Asians to the American cult of democracy.”
Hindu newspaper in Madras, expressed the view that “the bus boycott may well
turn out to be an epochal event in the history of the Southern Negro. If it
succeeds, it is bound to be copied by other Negroes all over the south where
the Whites are fighting a last-ditch battle to preserve segregation of the races.”
In hindsight, it would appear that the Indian correspondent’s insight into the
significance of the  Montgomery boycott  for the  future of American  race
relations was prescient.
The foreign coverage critical of American race relations was exacerbated by
the activities of expatriates like Josephine Baker, the American performer who
had built a considerable reputation in Europe as both a performance artist and
a political activist. The American embassy in Stocholm reported that Baker had
lectured to several audiences in the capital during February and March .
On  March she was the featured speaker at a charity benefit organized by the
Stockholm branch of the Social Democratic Party where the audience of five
thousand people included the prime minister and his wife. The minister of
defense introduced Baker, who spoke about developments in the United States
and described the current situation as “as bad as it has ever been.” Baker’s
speech provided grist for the ongoing debate among Swedish newspapers about
the racial situation in the United States. The embassy reported that Swedish
coverage of American race relations was both extensive and critical of the
meager record of racial reform.
The reasons for the “unspectacular record of accomplishment” was well
illustrated by an internal debate over American policy toward South Africa in
.  After a trip to Africa in , Mason Sears, who was the American
representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, forwarded a report
on his visit to the State Department. Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. repre-
sentative to the United Nations, sent a letter to Dulles expressing his view that
“Mason Sears may have irritated a few hard-shelled colonialists (although he
is on good terms with the actual administrators), but he has certainly made a
lot of friends for us with the natives, who have the future in front of them and
where it means something to the United States for the long pull.” As would
become evident, Sears’s report was also to be an irritant to the State Department.
. K. Balaraman, “‘Satyagraha’ in Alabama Negro Boycott of Buses Walk-to-Work Cam-
paign,” in The Hindu,  February . A typed copy of this article is attached to Fleck despatch
to the Department of State,  February , RG , ./-.
. Sweeney despatch to the Department of State,  March , RG , . /-.
. Ibid. According to the embassy, “All of the major Stockholm papers with New York
correspondents have published feature articles on the negro problem in the United States in which
criticism tends to outweigh the unspectacular record of accomplishment.” It was perhaps not
surprising that Swedish newspapers should devote considerable coverage to American race
relations given the prominent role of Gunnar Myrdal in shaping the American agenda for racial
reform after .
. The representative at the Trusteeship Council (Sears) memorandum to the secretary of
state,  February , U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, – 
(Washington, ), :.
Sears’s first recommendation was to suggest that the Fourth of July celebra-
tions hosted by American embassies and consulates in South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia, and Kenya should be opened to Africans. He justified his suggestion
by arguing that it was unseemly to pander to the racism of white settlers when
celebrating American independence. He further argued that that the inclusion
of Africans at these ceremonies would generate considerable goodwill for the
United States in the rest of Africa. Sears was not simply content to make this
recommendation and went on to advise that “this is a matter which should not
be left to the discretion of our own representatives on the spot. It should come as
a clear and specific order from the Secretary of State, especially considering the recent
disgraceful race riots in Alabama. It would please many citizens of the United
States, and a careful program should be worked out to see to it that American
opinion be informed of this decision.”
The secretary of state, however, was not inclined to agree with the role
assigned to him or with the arguments advanced for the policy change recom-
mended by Sears. Lodge again raised the issue with Dulles in late March, and
Dulles in his response on  April stated his agreement with the principle that
invitations should not be discriminatory either at home or abroad, but cau-
tioned that American representatives  abroad should be  attentive  to local
conditions.
Despite Dulles’s reluctance to endorse Sears’s approach, Sears decided to
pursue the matter. In June, he visited the State Department in Washington to
discuss his recommendation with members of the office dealing with Southern
African affairs. There, Sears indicated that the “unencouraging reply” that he
had received from the secretary notwithstanding, he still saw merit in the
proposal. He reiterated his view that the “inclusion of non-whites at these
receptions would have a strikingly beneficial effect upon the attitude of non-
Whites throughout Africa towards the U.S.” He also stated his view that while
such a policy shift would antagonize the Afrikaners, it would not have a
deleterious effect upon U.S.-South African relations.
As Sears was to discover, his views ran counter to the consensus in the
Department of State. The departmental officers with whom he met sought to
discourage Sears from further advocacy of his proposal. The desk officers
advised Sears that his recommendation would require a complete policy review
including consideration of issues of defense and the supply of strategic miner-
als. They expressed the view that his proposal would poison U.S.-South African
relations without “any significant compensatory benefit” and that U.S. policy
. Ibid.
. Ibid. (emphasis added).
. Editorial note, FRUS, –  :. This is a quote from a document cited in the editorial
note but the entire document is not provided.
. Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Mason Sears (U.S. representative and presi-
dent of the United Nations Trusteeship Council), Donald Dumont (officer in charge, Southern
Africa Affairs), and J. J. Durnan, A. J. Davit, W. R. Duggan, and W. M. Johnson (desk officers,
Southern Africa Affairs),  June , RG , ./-.
was to support “stability and orderly development in South Africa, including,
whenever possible and practicable, the persuasion of responsible South African
whites to moderate their restrictive policies.” Sears was informed that the
Egyptian charge d’affaires, who was himself dark-skinned, did not invite Afri-
cans to Egypt’s national day celebrations. Further, the Soviets had been asked
to leave South Africa after they had invited non-whites to their national day
reception, and the Indian representative had been expelled for “destructive”
contacts with non-white leaders. According to the officers, “American officials
had gone as far as possible, further than most, in developing contacts with
non-whites. . . . By way of example, when Bishop Jordan, an American Negro
Bishop of the AME (African Methodist Episcopal) Church, was a visitor to
South Africa in , Ambassador E. T. Wailes invited Bishop Jordan and his
wife to his residence for tea and included as his guests two South African
non-white clergymen who were also members of the AME Church in the
Union.” In addition, there was concern that inviting non-whites to the Fourth
of July celebrations would lead to a South African government response that
would effectively restrict the embassy’s ability to maintain contacts with non-
whites. Thus, practicing segregation in South Africa was seen as essential to
maintaining good relations with the apartheid regime and providing access to
the colored communities of the country. Sears was also informed that South
Africa’s recent efforts to promote friendly relations with all African territories
and willingness to recognize both the Sudan and Ghana suggested that the
“Afrikaner was not so inflexible as sometimes labeled.” The presentation by
the State Department’s officers was so persuasive that Sears called the next day
to inform Assistant Secretary of State Francis Wilcox that he was abandoning
his proposal and his efforts to see Dulles about the issue.
This episode demonstrated the Eisenhower administration’s sensitivity to
the concerns of the white minority government in South Africa. American
sympathy for the South African apartheid regime continued even as apartheid
came under increasing criticism in the wider international community. In ,
apartheid had been dropped from the agenda of the United Nations after a
Costa Rican resolution to have the United Nations General Assembly consider
the issue had failed to secure the vote of two-thirds of the members. The
United States had supported the effort to block continued UN consideration
and debate of apartheid, though it had carefully sought to avoid playing a
leadership role in the negotiations to remove apartheid from the UN agenda.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Memorandum of conversation between Sears and Dumont,  June , RG , .
/-. Sears conceded that his previous proposal would be detrimental to American national
interests.
. Acting director of the Office of Southern Africa Affairs (Hadsel) to the ambassador in Egypt
(Byroade),  August , FRUS, –  :–.
One reason for that avoidance of leadership on the issue was the fear that
adopting “such a position might place us in an unfavorable light and leave us
vulnerable to charges that we were taking the position  because of racial
conditions” at home. This awareness of the political liability that South Africa
posed for American foreign policy was recognized and articulated very clearly
to the ambassador-designate to South Africa in August . He was advised
that: “South Africa is one of the West’s greatest propaganda liabilities because
of its restrictive racial policy directed at all non-whites.The voting on South
African issues before the UN can cause the U.S. to be identified with colonialism
and the maintenance of apartheid.” The sense of shared interests between
South Africa and the United States – founded upon their common embrace of
white supremacy – was further strengthened by the deepening strategic and
economic ties between the two countries. Segregation, investment, and secu-
rity formed the tripod upon which “congenial” U.S.-South African relations
were mounted.
The Sears démarche had not occasioned any significant departure in the
fundamental tenets of American policy toward South Africa. It had, however,
sparked a discussion about the domestic ramifications of American policy
toward South Africa. Lodge, in his letter of  February to Dulles, had expressed
concerns about the domestic political repercussions of the segregated celebra-
tions described by Sears. Lodge suggested that the Democrats “would certainly
jump on the Fourth of July business if they knew about it. Per contra, we could
get some credit at home if we ended this practice.” Lodge’s comments may
have reflected sensitivities to the fact that  was an election year. With
competition for the black vote likely to be part of any electoral campaign, he
was undoubtedly seeking to ensure that the Republicans could gain some public
. Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly,
New York,  October , ibid., –.
. “U.S. Policy toward South Africa,” enclosure in Hadsel to Byroade,  August , ibid.,
–.
. Hadsel to Byroade,  August , ibid., –. The reasons for the identification of
American interests with that of the apartheid regime were clearly articulated to the ambassador-
designate. “From a practical point of view, our relations with South Africa are very friendly and
harmonious. South Africa is strongly anti-Communist and pro-West. It looks increasingly to the
United States, instead of Britain as formerly, as its model, its leader, and its source of assistance
and capital. There is more American capital invested in South Africa today than in any other
African territory – over $,,.  American companies are represented there, and there
are several thousand Americans resident throughout the Union. South Africans of all races are so
friendly and hospitable by nature that Americans find life in the Union usually congenial.” This
harmony was further buttressed by an American assistance program for the extraction of uranium
and its reliance upon South Africa for such other strategic minerals as manganese and chrome. In
addition, the two countries were working upon a Nuclear Reactor Treaty and improvement of
the South African early-warning radar system with help from the U.S. Air Force.
. A section of Lodge’s letter is reprinted as a footnote to Sears’s memorandum.  February
, FRUS, –  :.
relations benefits while denying the Democrats an issue for the presidential
campaign.
This Republican sensitivity to the implications of foreign policy for domes-
tic politics was not restricted to Lodge. In February , the New York Times
carried an item reporting that the former ambassador to India, Chester Bowles,
had expressed his view to Paul Hoffman, a liberal Republican, that the Ameri-
can position in Asia was deteriorating consistently and was losing ground to the
Communists. He advocated greater involvement of  Democrats in shaping
foreign policy to ensure that the Eisenhower administration pursued a genu-
inely bipartisan foreign policy in order to reverse the situation. In a letter
dated  February  to the Times, Bernard Katzen, a consultant to the
Republican National Committee, responded to Bowles. He welcomed the
proposal for a bipartisan foreign policy and expressed the view that “Mr.
Bowles’ proposal is not an unmixed blessing as long as the Democratic party is
dominated by an element which adheres to a policy of white supremacy.”
Katzen added that the memories of Western domination and oppression in Asia
were a critical factor spurring the growth of Communist influence. Citing the
dominance of the Southern wing of the Democratic party in Congress, Katzen
argued that Democratic participation in shaping American foreign policy
would not demonstrate an American commitment to self-determination, the
equality of all races, creeds, and colors, or a willingness to deal with the peoples
of Asia and Africa “out of respect and not out of sufferance.” The frankness
of the debate and Katzen’s invocation of the bigotry that permeated Southern
political life to stigmatize the Democrats reflected the growing sensitivity to
the issue of race in American politics after the Brown decision.
The debate over the appropriate American foreign policy strategy in dealing
with Asia was occurring in an international context electrified by the decision
of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan to sponsor a conference of
Afro-Asian states at Bandung, Indonesia, in early . As preparations for the
conference progressed, the State Department and John Foster Dulles became
. Lodge, from his position at the United Nations, continued to serve as an adviser to
Eisenhower on domestic politics, and this may help to explain in part the administration’s
increasing sensitivity to the issue of race on both American domestic politics and foreign policy.
For a description of Lodge’s role see Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as
Leader (Baltimore, ), . For an account of the debates within the administration about the
strategies needed to win black votes in  see Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil
Rights, –.
. C. L. Sulzberger, “In Search of a Bipartisan Asian Policy,” The New York Times,  February
. Bowles later served as the undersecretary in the Department of State in the Kennedy
administration.
. Letter to the editor, The New York Times,  February .
. Ibid. According to Katzen, “It is these memories of past grievances and wounded pride,
because of the color line, which are mainly responsible for the aloofness of the peoples of Asia
and Africa to the Western democracies.”
. Ibid.
increasingly aware of the unsettling implications of the conference for Western
pre-eminence in the international system. The situation was made worse by
the decision of Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., to attend the
Bandung Conference despite opposition from the Eisenhower administration.
At the meeting itself, it was left to Powell to defend the American record on
race relations and endorse the strategy of gradual racial reform that had
begun. Powell’s presence at Bandung, and the predicament it represented for
the Eisenhower administration, symbolized the complications that race in
American domestic policy posed for the administration’s efforts to position the
United States as a world leader. Bandung and Powell represented the assertive-
ness of people of color both inside and outside of the United States and the
growing challenge to white supremacy in both international and domestic
terms. Inevitably, the actions of the world of color outside of the United States
had implications for American domestic politics, a reality underscored by the
conference at Bandung.
This sensitivity to non-European views of the direction of American foreign
policy had been displayed by John Foster Dulles as early as . The concern
among people of the Third World about the American agenda was addressed
in an even more direct fashion by Vice President Nixon. The latter had made
a tour of several African countries in early  and had attended the inde-
pendence celebrations of Ghana during that tour. In his report to President
Eisenhower, submitted before the Little Rock crisis, Nixon wrote: “We cannot
. The American response to the Bandung Conference has been explored in Cary Fraser,
“Grappling with the Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Bandung Conference”
(Paper presented at the  Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
held at Georgetown University, – June ). Dulles was particularly forthright about his
opposition to the implications of the Bandung Conference in a meeting at the Department of
State in January : “The Secretary said that, if the nations invited to Bandung, acquired the
habit of meeting from time to time without Western participation, India and China because of
their vast populations will certainly dominate the scene and one by-product will be a very solid
block of anti-Western votes in the United Nations.” Memorandum of conversation, Subject:
Afro-Asian Conference, Secretary’s Office,  January ,  January , RG , ./-.
. For accounts of Powell’s trip see Charles V. Hamilton, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political
Biography of an American Dilemma (New York,), –; Wil Haygood, King of the Cats: The Life
and Times of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York, ), –; Plummer, Rising Wind, –; and
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Adam by Adam: The Autobiography of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York,
), –. In his autobiography, Powell remembered his trip to Bandung as a transformative
experience that led him to become more militant in his espousal of the civil rights agenda within
the United States. At the time, he was castigated by many in the black community while endearing
himself to influential whites and the Eisenhower administration.
. Radio address by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, secretary of state, on his recent trip
to the Near East and South Asia,  June , FO /, Public Record Office, Kew, United
Kingdom. In his address, Dulles commented on the fact that “most of the peoples of the Near East
and South Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others.
They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because, it is reasoned,
our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the old
colonial interests of our allies.”
talk equality to the peoples of Africa and Asia and practice inequality in the United States.
In the national interest, as well as for the moral issues involved, we must support the
necessary steps which will assure orderly progress towards the elimination of discrimina-
tion in the United States.” Thus, for Nixon, Dulles, Lodge, and other American
policymakers, it was evident that the legal architecture of segregation and its
implication of white supremacy in the United States were significant impedi-
ments to the credibility of the United States as it sought to extend its influence
into the non-European world.
The State Department’s willingness to defend South Africa did not imply
that the American government was hostile to the idea that a transition from
colonial rule was imminent by the mid-s. One of  the early strategies
suggested for dealing with the changing African situation was for the United
States to adopt a policy “supporting a multi-racial approach to the problems of
Africa South of the Sahara. Any other course of action would, in the long run,
meet with such domestic opposition within the United States that it would be
next to impossible to carry out.” American support for multiracialism in Africa
was born of the declining legitimacy of white supremacist ideology in American
domestic politics. At one level, it was a reflection of the sustained interest of
African-American activists in African issues. At another level, support for aid
to Africa could reconcile both domestic and foreign policy imperatives – aid
could be used as a mechanism for extending American influence in Africa and
accommodating African-American sentiment on an issue of great sensitivity.
In the years leading up to the Little Rock crisis, American segregationist
practices and assumptions of white supremacy had come under question from
both its allies and enemies in Europe and from the increasingly assertive
non-European world. The foreign criticism stimulated the growing recognition
of the fact that American domestic politics had become a foreign policy issue
. Richard Nixon, “The Emergence of Africa: Report to President Eisenhower by Vice-
President Nixon,” Department of State Bulletin  ( April ): – (emphasis added).
. Assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs (Allen)
memorandum to the secretary of state,  August , FRUS, –  :.
. For accounts of African-American efforts to influence American policy toward Africa see
Plummer, Rising Wind; and Von Eschen, Race against Colonialism.
. This sense of the increasing importance of Africa to American politics and foreign policy
was evidenced in a State Department memorandum in December . Arguing the case for the
extension of American technical assistance to European colonies in Africa and the Caribbean, the
memorandum suggested that  “If we do not  gradually  ease into  the picture  there,  a  rising
nationalistic sentiment among the peoples south of the Sahara will look elsewhere for help and
sympathy. It is a most fertile field for future (and not so distant future) Soviet activity. Moreover,
American Negroes are beginning to look on Africa south of the Sahara with somewhat the same
kind of sympathy and interest as American Zionists look on Israel. We should capitalize on this
sentiment, utilizing it to work towards evolution rather than revolution in Africa. American
Negroes, who are our best hope of keeping Africa oriented towards the United States, are anxious
for the Department to help in the improvement of economic conditions in Africa and would be
very much upset by a decision against any technical assistance programs there.” See assistant
secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs (Allen) memorandum to the
secretary of state,  December , FRUS, –  :.
in an era of increasing American involvement with, and attempts to influence,
the international system. Moreover, the growing sensitivity to issues of race
promoted a reconsideration of the importance of Africa to American politics
and the views of African Americans in devising American foreign policy. In
addition, the Suez crisis of  had revealed the widening rift between the
Eisenhower administration and its European allies over the style and objectives
of Western engagement with the non-European world. It was perhaps inevita-
ble that, after the humiliation of Suez, European sentiment would tend to be
unsympathetic to the Eisenhower administration’s hubris on race. Having cast
itself as more enlightened than its European partners on the issue of colonialism
in dealing with Suez, the United States found itself challenged to display its
progressive sentiment on race in its domestic politics. Little Rock had become
the Suez of the Eisenhower administration – a moment of crisis that forced a
fundamental and radical reassessment of existing approaches to dealing with
the world of color. And like the European colonial powers after Suez, it would
require several years and changes in existing leadership – the accession to office
by Harold Macmillan in Britain, Charles de Gaulle in France, and John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in the United States – for the required changes
to be implemented in the various countries.
Eisenhower sent troops to deal with the crisis in Little Rock with the full
recognition that he needed to reassert the authority of the federal government
against a challenge from a Southern governor who had insisted upon defying
the authority of the federal courts on the volatile issue of desegregation. The
decision to send troops into the South came barely two months after the
president had publicly stated that he could not envisage the need to use troops
to enforce the orders of federal courts. For Eisenhower, given his desire to
court Southern whites as a key constituency in the  and  presidential
elections and his own sympathy for their sensitivities on the issue of ending
segregation, it was undoubtedly a wrenching decision. It was also probable that
one of the reasons for his vacillation in his dealings with Governor Orval Faubus
in Arkansas may have been the fear that sending military forces into the South,
as the Republicans had done during Reconstruction, would cost his party dearly
in the  election.
. Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, .
. One of the interesting aspects of the workings of the Eisenhower White House was the
care lavished upon ensuring that the administration did not appear to be solicitous of African-
American concerns. One perspective was provided by E. Frederic Morrow, the first black
presidential assistant. As the racial tensions in the country mounted and the Little Rock crisis
unfolded, Morrow lamented, “I have been powerless to do anything. The President’s advisers have
not asked me my thinking on these matters, and I am too well-schooled in protocol to advance
any uninvited ideas.” E. Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the White House (New York, ), –.
Robert Burk was of the view  that  the White  House was  more  interested  in  having black
government employees “as symbols of national racial democracy rather than in their usefulness
as policy makers.” As a consequence, the resident troubleshooter on racial matters was Maxwell
Rabb, a former volunteer assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge who was Jewish and “liberal.” See Burk,
The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, .
In spite of his own personal and political inclinations, Eisenhower’s decision
reflected the success of such advisers as Attorney General Herbert Brownell
and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in persuading the president that the
Little Rock crisis was a defining moment. According to Brownell, the admini-
stration had been preparing for a crisis on the scale of the one that developed
in Little Rock. Thus, contingency planning had focused upon establishing the
legal framework for presidential intervention in a crisis.
Dulles, for his part, had indicated in early September that the pictures of
the confrontation in Little Rock had not been helpful to American foreign
policy. Just hours before Eisenhower addressed the nation on radio and
television about his decision to send troops, Dulles and Brownell discussed the
. Department of State Press Release, no. ,  September , John Foster Dulles Papers,
box , Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Cartoon by Ollie Harrington. Permission: The BALTIMORE AFRO-AMERICAN
NEWSPAPER.
“No, I ain’t scared, but you gotta admit, this is a hell of a way to get a education!”
crisis. Dulles reiterated his view that “this situation is ruining our foreign policy.
The effect of this in Asia and Africa will be worse for us than Hungary was for
the Russians.” Brownell informed Dulles that Eisenhower had been given “the
USIA report which mentioned the use Nasser and Khruschev were making of
it. The President was very alert to this aspect.” The international reaction to
the crisis had become a factor weighing upon the administration’s strategy for
dealing with the crisis. Eisenhower’s address explicitly recognized the interna-
tional reaction: “it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done
to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the
world.” The address was translated into forty-three languages and the details
of the deployments were broadcast over the Voice of America. Eisenhower was
acting to reassure foreign audiences that his administration was committed to
enforcing the authority of the federal government, including the use of troops,
to protect the rights of African Americans.
The increasing international attention to the desegregation struggle in the
United States was not prompted solely by the international prominence of the
United States and its conflict with the Soviet Union. The inherent advantages
of a well-developed system for disseminating news internationally also con-
tributed, as did European resentment of American behavior during the Suez
crisis. Just as important was the fact that the developments in the United States
awakened anxieties among the European states that were confronted by analo-
gous problems in their colonies or in their own societies. The criticism of the
United States that emerged often reflected the awareness that few Europeans
or their descendants outside of Europe were able to cast the proverbial first
stone on the issue of the treatment of minorities within Europe or people of
color in the world outside of Europe. They were aware that the resolution of
the problem of segregation in the United States would have enormous impli-
cations for their own ability to deal with the color line in their own societies or
empires. Nazi Germany had demonstrated the ultimate logic of the ideology
. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between the secretary of state and the attorney
general (Brownell), Washington,  September , FRUS, –  (Washington, ), :–.
In an earlier conversation on the same day with Senator William Knowland, the influential
Republican from California, Dulles indicated that the situation made “him sick at heart” after
Knowland had expressed the view that “if we can’t counteract the Little Rock thing we will undo
all the good will we have build [sic] up in the world.” Memorandum of telephone conversation,
 September , Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Calls Series, box , Eisenhower
Library.
. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between the secretary of state and the attorney
general (Brownell), Washington,  September , FRUS, –  :–.
. Radio and television address to the American people on the situation in Little Rock, 
September , Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
(Washington,), –. In a letter to Senator Francis Case of South Dakota, Eisenhower
thanked him for his approval of Eisenhower’s address and continued “unfortunately, a handful of
irresponsible citizens have managed to defame the image of America before all the world.”
Eisenhower to Francis Case,  September 5, Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF -A-5,
box .
of racial supremacy. The experience of the United States, which held the
largest minority of color among the Western states, and its leadership role
within the Western alliance had become a touchstone of  the relationship
between the white and colored worlds.
From Brussels, the American embassy reported that the press coverage of
the racial situation in the United States betrayed resentment “of so-called
American ‘anti-colonialism’ [and questioned] whether America’s handling of
its racial problem qualifies it to champion allegedly oppressed peoples living
under colonial rule.” The dispatch indicated that the  Belgian response
reflected concern about the situation in the Belgian Congo, where the record
of the white colonists on race relations left a lot to be desired. Similarly, the
embassy in Paris attributed the heightened emotional reaction to the verdict in
the Emmett Till murder case to “the unfortunate timing of the event. The trial
broke at a time when French sensitivities were aroused over foreign criticism
of the French handling of the North African situation. [The acquittals] gave
the French an opportunity, which was eagerly seized, to point to racial problems
in the United States and to indulge in an outraged sense of indignation and
innocence.” The embassy  in  Auckland reported that  concern  about  the
parallels that could be drawn between the treatment of the Maori in New
Zealand and blacks in the United Sates seemed to have motivated some of the
harsh criticism directed at the United States.
Yet reaction to the American racial situation was not relatively uniform
across all of the European imperial states. The American consul in Oporto
reported that a commentator for one of the local newspapers, in his commen-
tary on race relations in the United States, was much more sanguine about the
history of Portuguese race relations. According to an editorial in Jornal de
Noticias, “ Fortunately, in our country racial prejudice does not exist; it is
repudiated by our people, which in my opinion is one of the marks of the
superiority of their character and intelligence.” Thus, for some the racial
situation in the United States was a comforting reassurance of  their own
. The USIA reported from Bonn that while the Little Rock crisis had received extensive
press coverage in Germany, there had been considerable restraint in commentary on the issue.
The lack of criticism was attributed to “German awareness [of their] own vulnerability on [the]
question [of] persecution racial minority.” Bruce tel. to USIA,  October , RG , ./-.
. Alger despatch to the Department of State,  March , RG , . /-.
. McBride despatch to the Department of State,  October , RG , ./-.
. Fraleigh despatch to the Department of State,  March , RG , ./-.
. The editorial continued: “In our universities no anti-racial measures have ever been
considered. On the contrary, the colored man is treated with special affection. The negro among
us enjoys popularity, as witness that of certain soccer players. Likewise in Brazil, where despite
the large percentage of colored citizens, racial prejudice is nonexistent. On the contrary, the
Brazilian is fully aware of the importance of the negro contribution to his civilization – the docility,
simplicity and resigned courage in the face of the worse hardships, the obstinate sensuality – as
pointed out by a favorite poet.” Reed despatch to the Department of State,  March , RG ,
./-.
exceptional enlightenment on the issues of race and their own imperial strate-
gies.  The  lack of irony in  the statement suggested the capacity  for self-
deception by the imperial powers – even those representative of the European
fascist impulse of the s.
Nonetheless, the Little Rock crisis, involving as it did the direct challenge
to the authority of the federal government and the use of troops to resolve the
confrontation, magnified both the stakes and the level of concern. The embassy
in Brussels reported that Little Rock and segregation was receiving more press
coverage than any previous American domestic issue. In addition to criticisms
of American racial bigotry and the questioning of “the high moral attitude
adopted by the United States in international affairs . . . many newspapers now
seem to be much more concerned about the effects of Little Rock on American
prestige in Asia and Africa than in Belgium.” These concerns were echoed in
Berne where the embassy reported that the “general reaction is one of sober
dismay over display of such violence and resulting incalculable harm done to
[the] occidental position throughout the non-European world.” The Swiss
concern also extended to the fact that Little Rock had occurred at the same
time that the United Nations General Assembly was debating the Soviet-led
invasion of Hungary in  and its aftermath. In effect, European commentary
acknowledged that American foreign policy had been compromised by the
crisis in Little Rock. In Luxembourg, the reaction was very similar to that of
the Swiss. The Socialist Tageblatt editorialized that “Little Rock was a happy
find for the Communists as a means of overshadowing the condemnation of the
Hungarian massacre and the new Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union.” From
Amsterdam, the embassy reported that the Little Rock crisis was seen as
“unbecoming of a nation which continually affirms its devotion to principles of
liberty, equality, and equal opportunity for all citizens.” In addition, there was
the fear that the entire episode would undermine America’s moral authority in
the world of color.
The fear of the damage done by the Little Rock episode was generally
assuaged by the decision to send troops to enforce the orders of the federal
courts. In Belgium, the “despatch of federal troops was warmly applauded and
interpreted as a clear demonstration of American determination to enforce the
law.” In Amsterdam, one newspaper saw the president’s decision to send the
troops to Little Rock as analogous to the decision to send troops to Europe
during the Second World War – it was a commitment to the protection of
human rights. According to the Luxembourg Tageblatt, Eisenhower’s decision
. Vance despatch to the Department of State,  October , RG , . /-.
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to send troops “saves not only a principle but the soul of a country which, if it
had permitted the situation in Little Rock to continue, could no longer have
laid claim to being the leader of the free bloc.”
The response in Africa provided a very revealing insight into the current
state of opinion in the European colonial possessions. In Nigeria, the West
African Pilot raised the question: “What moral right have Americans to condemn
apartheid in South Africa when still maintaining it by law?” and concluded that
Little Rock “has shown that the US has no moral claim to be leader of Western
democracies; that one can’t be world champion of the colonial peoples while
championing inequality in one’s backyard.” Vice President Nixon had cer-
tainly captured African sentiment in his report to the president. In Dakar, the
American consul general reported that the French and African reactions to
Little Rock differed substantially. The French reaction, he reported, was a sense
of self-congratulation and moral superiority since “we do things better here
and in France.” He reported that many of his French friends, who in previous
months had been complaining about sending their children to schools with
African pupils, “suddenly, became rather proud of the fact. Numerous French
officials hinted, always politely, that perhaps Little Rock would make the United
States a little more sympathetic to France’s problem in Algeria, and especially
at the coming U.N. Session.” The local population, however, was apparently
impressed with Eisenhower’s firm stance during the crisis, and the use of troops
was seen as a reflection of the president’s resolve. As a consequence the consul
general saw the president’s handling of the matter as having substantially
improved the American image in Africa.
In South Africa, there was a similar development where sentiment differed
among whites and blacks. The consul general in Johannesburg reported that
blacks were generally shocked by the incident but had grown to appreciate that
the events triggering the crisis were “counter to general public opinion in the
United States and to U.S. national policy.” On the other hand, the whites seemed
to feel that their own apartheid policies had been vindicated by the crisis in
Little Rock. In Mozambique, the consulate reported that Little Rock had
become a symbol  of black-white relations  in the United States  and  that
. Christensen despatch to the Department of State,  September , RG , . /-.
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Senegalese politician that the president’s action in dispatching troops to Little Rock had had an
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American “moral standing has been considerably damaged and in [the] Portu-
guese view here any pretension of an American to advise any European
Government on African affairs at this point would be hypocrisy.”
In Indonesia, the pro-government newspaper Suluh Indonesia published an
open letter to the American ambassador and the American community in
Jakarta that was remarkable for its spirited criticism of the events in Little Rock.
The newspaper pointed to the contradiction of Americans championing de-
mocracy abroad even as domestic race relations raised serious questions about
the American commitment to democracy at home. The newspaper further
suggested that the citizens of Arkansas and other Southern states should pay a
visit to Indonesia to learn about tolerance.
On a much more practical level, the Little Rock situation was also problem-
atic for American diplomacy at the United Nations. Henry Cabot Lodge, after
applauding the president for his decision to send troops, reported that “at the
United Nations I can see clearly the harm that the riots in Little Rock are doing
to our foreign relations. More than two-thirds of the world is non-white and
the reactions of the representatives of these people is easy to see. I suspect that
we lost several votes on the Chinese communist item because of Little Rock.”
On the positive side, Lodge reported that Indian prime minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, during the course of a visit to Japan, had praised Eisenhower’s actions
in sending troops to Little Rock. Lodge opined, “That goes a long way.”
Thus, the Little Rock crisis opened a window through which the interna-
tional politics of race became inextricably linked with American domestic
politics. The gap between the American championship of democracy abroad
and the reality of violent resistance to racial and political equality at home had
been laid bare for the entire world to examine and pass judgment. In the wake
of the Little Rock crisis, the United States discovered that it needed to devise
a solution to the issues of racial inequality and the politics of exclusion at home
in a way that would make its championship of democracy and anti-colonialism
abroad a credible foreign policy. The decision to use the troops in Little Rock
had clearly signaled a level of commitment by the federal government to the
idea of desegregation. In a sense, American efforts to assert a leadership role in
the non-European world had become hinged to the idea that its domestic race
relations would be an index of its “fitness” to claim such leadership. It was a
context that would fuel the ongoing struggle for equality in the United States
and the rise of a civil rights movement that was aware of the capacity of
international scrutiny to influence the course of American politics.
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One of the immediate consequences of the Little Rock crisis for American
foreign policy was the preparation within the State Department of a paper on
“Talking Points to Overcome Adverse Reaction to Little Rock Incident.” The
information compiled was then circulated to all field missions and the United
States Mission at the United Nations for their guidance. In a cover instruction
from the Department of State to the chiefs of mission or principal officers,
Acting Secretary Christian Herter stated “The Department realizes further
that remedial action will be a long range operation and that the damage that
has been  done the United States by sensational newspaper accounts and
photographs cannot be repaired overnight.” He asked recipients to give serious
thought to the steps needed “to start the long and slow job of putting these
unfortunate incidents in their proper perspective.” As the document made
clear, the State Department was concerned to ensure that international views
of Little Rock should be seen as an aberrant episode in the ongoing process of
racial reform. It emphasized that in the majority of American states, the process
of school desegregation was not as contentious as the Little Rock crisis may
have suggested. It also argued that the increasing employment of blacks in the
federal government, the desegregation of the military, and the growth in home
ownership and rising income levels among non-whites in the United States all
indicated the quiet improvement in the lives of black Americans. The document
then went on to explain that the problems arising from its efforts to lower
discriminatory barriers were not singular to the United States, and that the
commitment to freedom and equality for individuals had been affirmed by the
crisis itself. The final paragraph was a revealing glimpse into the concerns of
the authors of the document: “In the United States, national authority is being
used not to suppress individual equality and freedom but to uphold them. In
the Little Rock incident national authority has been invoked to maintain [the]
equal rights of a minority. In the Soviet Union national authority has been
repeatedly invoked to suppress the rights of minorities.” It was evident that
there was a perceived need to avoid any parallels being drawn between the
policies of the Soviet Union and those pursued by the United States.
The Eisenhower administration had become increasingly concerned about
the exploitation of its domestic racial problems by the Communist states. In
the wake of the Little Rock crisis, Eisenhower asked Henry Cabot Lodge for
. Berding memorandum to Rubottom,  October , RG , . /-.
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only initiative by the Eisenhower administration to provide its perspective on the situation of black
Americans in the contemporary United States. In November , Secretary of Labor James
Mitchell sent Dulles a copy of his article “The Negro Moves Up,” which was due for publication
in the December issue of the Reader’s Digest. Mitchell to Dulles,  November , Dulles Papers,
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“suggestions to repair the damage done to our world position by the events at
Little Rock.” Lodge suggested that U.S. diplomatic representatives should
make a sustained effort to offer hospitality to distinguished colored people
across the board and not only in the non-European world. Further, he recom-
mended that the United States extend a loan to India, given India’s importance
among the new nations in the international system. He also reiterated his
position  that the United  States should support a major UN program  for
multilateral economic aid to the Third World and welcomed recent signs that
the State Department was coming to support such a program. He indicated that
“The prestige  which the Soviet  Union is getting  because of its  satellites
intensifies the importance of effective non-communist technical and economic
assistance coming in a way which does not look like the US-USSR power
struggle.” Thus, Little Rock had become a catalyst for the reassessment by the
administration of  its terms of engagement with the Third World and the
increasing competition with the Communist powers for influence in the non-
European world.
This concern with the implications of American race relations for American
relations in the non-European world was of immediate concern during the
Little Rock crisis. The finance minister of Ghana, K. A. Gbedemah, visited the
United States in September–October  – in the midst of the Little Rock
crisis. Gbedemah had gone to the United States for meetings at the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund and to lead the Ghanaian delegation to
the United Nations. He had also scheduled meetings with American officials
to discuss American assistance to Ghana. On the way to Maryland Sate College
to deliver an address, in the company of three black American students, one of
whom had lived and operated a school in Ghana, Gbedemah was refused
sit-down service at a restaurant in Dover, Delaware. When the story was
revealed in the press, Eisenhower invited Gbedemah to the White House for
breakfast with himself and Vice President Nixon. The American ambassador
in Ghana also made a public statement deploring the incident. Eisenhower’s
gesture helped to defuse the situation, but the entire incident symbolized the
linkage between American race relations and foreign policy. The foreign policy
implications of the incident were of considerable importance since the United
. Lodge to the president,  October , FRUS, – (Washington, ), :–. In
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prestige has suffered, and if you have any ideas as to how we might try to repair the damage, after
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States had been attempting to forestall the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Ghana and the major Communist states, the Soviet Union and the
People’s Republic of China. The incident had also occurred after Nixon’s visit
to Africa, including his participation in the independence celebrations in
Ghana, out of which had come his suggestion that American foreign and
domestic policies had to be consistent on the issue of race. For the administra-
tion, the year  served as a watershed. Little Rock had forced a departure
from the studied indifference to foreign perceptions of American race relations
that had shaped the administration’s response to the Autherine Lucy case in
Alabama.
The transition from colonial rule had begun in Africa, and the administra-
tion was clearly sensitive to its implications for both domestic politics and
foreign policy. In May , the chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic
Policy, Clarence Randall, presented an oral report of his trip to Africa in March
. There is extensive documentation on the U.S. effort to disrupt Soviet and Chinese efforts
to establish relations with Ghana and Liberia in FRUS, –  :–.
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“Congratulations Sergeant Smith. You’re to be the first man shot to the moon.
It’s sort of a goodwill gesture to our African friends!”
and April at a meeting of the National Security Council. Eisenhower com-
mended Randall’s written report to the members of the NSC and described it
as “interesting, intriguing, and valuable.” Randall described his visit to Africa
as “a very stirring adventure” and emphasized that economic and political
concerns should outweigh military considerations in shaping American policy
toward the sub-Saharan region. He argued that the rise of nationalism was
sweeping Central Africa and that the demand for political independence was
somewhat “terrifying, as one deduced from reading the biography of Nkru-
mah.” After a discussion of the records of the various colonial powers in the
continent, Randall pointed to the dilemma that had become increasingly
tortuous for American foreign policy – the United States was caught between
its professions of support for an end to colonialism and the demand by its
European partners that it refrain from providing assistance to their African
colonies. Even as he emphasized the growing importance of the African
nationalist challenge to European colonial rule, Randall, in response to the
prompting of General  Robert  Cutler,  acknowledged that the  situation  in
Liberia was of some concern. He prefaced his remarks on Liberia with the
admonition that: “this was a very sensitive situation, discussion of which should
be kept within the walls of this room.” He reported that American companies
in Liberia were practicing segregation and had not treated African workers well.
As a consequence, the Liberian government had passed an anti-segregation law
as an indication of its discontent with the policies of the American companies
that Morrow termed “undemocratic and almost uncivilized.” Unlike Suez,
Liberia made it difficult for the American government to assume the high
ground in an effort to distance the United States from its colonial partners. In
fact, the situation in Liberia reflected the successful export of American ideas
. According to Morrow, who attended the meeting, “Randall came back to this country with
a shocked reaction to the treatment of Africans receive from the various nations still holding
spheres of influence on that continent.” Morrow, Black Man in the White House, . The similarities
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Chace and Peter Collier (New York, ), –.
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groups there.
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on race that had defined American life since the late nineteenth century.
Randall’s concerns about the wider dissemination of the information in his
briefing was indicative of the sense of siege that was overtaking the administra-
tion on the issue of race as a liability for American foreign policy.
The predicament that the American record on race posed for foreign policy
was subsequently confirmed by a memorandum, “Treatment of Minorities in
the United States – Impact on Our Foreign Relations,” prepared by the Civil
Rights Commission at the request of the White House. In its summary review,
the memorandum acknowledged that racial discrimination had undermined
the moral authority of the United States and provided ammunition for the
anti-American propaganda disseminated by the Communist states. The memo-
randum also argued that the “adoption by the Accra Conference of Inde-
pendent African States in April  of a resolution condemning racial
discrimination and segregation is typical of the continuing concern with this
question of the nations of Africa and Asia.” The questioning of the moral
authority of the American government also came from white-controlled gov-
ernments in Africa since American racial policies seemed to offer no substantial
improvement upon their own records.
One example of the latter sentiment was reported by the American consul
in Salisbury who cited a feature article in the Rhodesia Herald of  September
. The special correspondent who authored the article provided a favorable
assessment of Rhodesia’s handling of racial problems as compared with the
United States and claimed that a Negro would receive a fairer trial in Rhodesia
than in any state in the American South. It was an indication of the American
record on race in the late s that white colonists in Southern Rhodesia could
lay claim to a more impartial judicial system. The special correspondent for
the Rhodesia Herald had touched upon a very sensitive nerve – the treatment of
blacks by the judicial system in the South. In August , an Alabama court
sentenced Jimmy Wilson, a black man, to death for stealing $. from a white
woman. The death sentence created adverse reaction to the American justice
system. In a telegram to Governor James Folsom of Alabama, Dulles indicated
that the Department of State and its missions abroad had received considerable
correspondence protesting the death sentence. In addition to  letters and
telegrams, the embassy in London had received a petition for clemency signed
by , people. In Africa, “Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah has inquired
urgently as to the facts in the case and our embassy in Liberia has reported that
the execution of Wilson would greatly damage the position of the United States
in all of West Africa.” Dulles abjured any effort to influence the case or the
governor’s handling of  the matter. Folsom reported, however, that he was
. John A. Calhoun (Civil Rights Commission) memorandum to Gerald D. Morgan (White
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receiving up to one thousand letters per day, with some petitions containing
four thousand signatures, from countries throughout the world. He indicated
that after the judicial appeals process had been fully exhausted, the records
would them be submitted to his office for review and a clemency hearing. On
 September, Folsom informed Dulles that he had commuted Wilson’s death
sentence to life imprisonment. Dulles’s correspondence with Folsom on the
Jimmy Wilson case reflected the Eisenhower administration’s emerging post-
 strategy of redressing the problems of American race relations as soon as
they became an influence upon foreign views of the United States. It was also
evidence of the increasing sensitivity of American leaders, even in the South,
to international public opinion and criticism of American racial policies.
This shift in policy was not restricted solely to the domestic aspects of race.
In the autumn of , the United States voted for a UN General Assembly
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Resolution condemning apartheid – a switch from its previous efforts to keep
the issue away from debate within the United Nations. In a conversation with
the South African foreign minister, Eric Louw, after the vote on the UN
resolution, the American ambassador sought to convince the foreign minister
that the  United  States had been instrumental in moderating the original
resolution. Despite this assurance, the ambassador reported that the South
African attributed the shift in American policy to a hardening of the American
position, “partially due at least to our domestic problems on racial issues.” The
American ambassador attempted to devalue American press reports  that
stressed the connection between American domestic problems and the Ameri-
can vote in the UN but he conceded that “there might be some connection.”
Louw, revealing the chagrin that afflicted the white minority regime, responded
that his government was wounded by the American decision and that the U.S.
decision to support the resolution had “mattered perhaps more than all other
votes put together . . . in view [of] its predominant position of leadership in
[the] Western world.” The American decision to vote against apartheid at the
United Nations in  was symbolic of the heightened American sensitivity to
the politics of race in both domestic and foreign policy. The joint public
embrace of white supremacy was no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-South
African relationship, and the conversation between the American ambassador
and the South African foreign minister revealed the wrenching emotions that
accompanied the separation.
As a consequence, symbolic steps to improve foreign perceptions of Ameri-
can foreign policy on the issue of race became evident in American activities
at the United Nations. In , the United States supported the candidacy of
the Haitian ambassador, Max Dorsinville, for the presidency of the Trusteeship
Council for that year in preference to the candidate from Italy. The State
Department viewed Dorsinville as a suitable candidate since it was the turn of
a non-administering country to serve as president. Ambassador Dorsinville had
displayed “relative moderation and sincere endeavors to find compromises in
difficult situations,” and his previous experience with UN activities in Franco-
phone Africa had made him an obvious candidate for the job. In addition, if
elected, Dorsinville would be “the first person of the Negro race to serve as
President of an important UN organ.” The Italians subsequently withdrew their
candidate, whom the State Department considered an excellent choice for the
. Embassy in South Africa tel. to the Department of State,  November , FRUS, –
:–. The ambassador went on to explain that: “For one thing it could hardly be denied that
our problems at home had made more people aware of and think about racial problems than in
years of the recent past. Also if we felt compelled to uphold a vital principle considered West in
East-West struggle for men’s minds in our own country to extent of much regretted necessity use
troops to enforce courts’ decision and integration, we would perhaps be less likely avoid taking a
position against segregation and discrimination abroad.” The curious phrasing of the ambassador’s
explanation of the shift in the Eisenhower administration’s stance on desegregation is very
suggestive of the intellectual dissonance that accompanied the waning of “white supremacy” as
the official orthodoxy in American life.
position  in . The decision  to support the  Haitian candidate for the
presidency of the Trusteeship Council reflected an incremental step in the
policy of distancing the United States from its European colonial partners.
Even though the administration shifted ground in its support for colonialism
and apartheid in the wake of Little Rock, there continued to be a fundamental
ambivalence on the issues of race and white minority rule in the non-European
world. On  March , the South African police killed  people and injured
 in Sharpeville as a result of the escalating confrontation over apartheid
policies enacted by the South African government. The director of the Office
of News in the State Department, Lincoln White, issued a statement the
following day deploring the killings. White refused to interpret the statement
and declined to comment on questions from the press. It would seem that
White’s statement had been issued without the approval of Secretary of State
Christian Herter. In response to Eisenhower’s inquiry about the statement,
Herter informed the president that there had been a failure to follow estab-
lished procedure  before the statement had been made  to the  press.  The
secretary was furious and saw the statement as a discourtesy to South Africa.
Eisenhower advised that the South African government should be informed
that “although we are much distressed by events in South Africa, we do not
regard it as our business to make public statements about this, and officially
regret having done so.” The president further indicated that “This action
should be kept secret.” Herter’s reaction was based in part on the fact that the
standard procedures for the release of statements to the press had not been
followed. He was also concerned that “the issuance of a statement of this nature
outspokenly critical of a Government with which we maintain friendly rela-
tions, and on a subject which has not only world-wide interest, but also involves domestic
political factors – is, it seems to me, a decision to be taken only at the highest level
in the Department of State.” Herter was also afraid that the United States had
“clearly taken sides and might be accused of inciting a revolution.” Ironically,
the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations had given the statement a warm
reception. The group had extended thanks to the United States for it even as
they sought an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss
events in South Africa.
The reaction in South Africa to the American statement was revealing about
the polarization of opinion on the issue of apartheid. The U.S. embassy reported
that the South African government was bitterly resentful, a sentiment shared
by the “great mass of Afrikaner people, who feel we have sold out Whites to
. Deputy assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs (Henderson) to
the undersecretary of state (Herter),  January , FRUS, – (Washington, ), :–.
. Editorial note, ibid. :–. The editorial note contains only excerpts of memoranda
dealing with the issue.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Ibid. (emphasis added).
curry favor with Blacks.” While the embassy sensed that relations between the
two governments had not been permanently damaged, it was clear that the
South African government was feeling increasingly besieged by the apparent
loss of American endorsement of its racial policies. On the other hand, the
embassy also reported that the conservative opposition, while regretful of
American commentary on the internal affairs of South Africa, agreed that the
“civilized world [was] horrified at [the] situation, by Nationalist race policies.”
Further, the liberal opposition endorsed the statement, while  non-White
groups were “delighted [with] our statement and belief spreading that US now
supports their course.” The embassy also reported that the government was
planning to ban the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanists and
there was a tense atmosphere “to which our statement [on] this contributed.”
The embassy closed its despatch with a reminder that the foreign minister, Eric
Louw, had been informed that “there is no change in US policy toward his
country.” On the other hand, there was no public retraction of the statement
issued by the State Department without the secretary’s approval.
“YOU THINK HE MIGHT GET INTERESTED IN US IF WE MOVED TO SOUTH
AFRICA?”. From: Straight Herblock (Simon & Shuster, ).
. Embassy in South Africa tel. to the Department of State,  March , ibid., –. In
June , however, the United States decided to admit Oliver Tambo of the African National
The conflicting signals coming from the State Department, the supportive
response of  white and colored South Africans, the welcome given by the
Afro-Asian group at the United Nations to the American statement, and the
dismay of the Afrikaner regime were evidence of the multiple pressures upon
American policy. In this context, the president’s actions were revealing about
the struggle to shape American foreign policy in the non-European world after
Little Rock. The strength of Eisenhower’s personal support for the South
African government became clear in Anglo-American discussions on the South
African issue before the UN Security Council. President Eisenhower hosted a
meeting with a British delegation led by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at
Camp David. Macmillan sought American support to ensure that the UN
Security Council statement coming out of the meeting would be innocuous
and hoped that the American representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his role
as chair of the council would facilitate that process. Eisenhower agreed to the
strategy advanced by Macmillan. The president’s stance reflected, as did
the decision to send troops to Little Rock, his personal ambivalence about
the widening challenge to the politics of white supremacy and the linkages in
his views of the racial problems in South Africa and the United States.
Eisenhower’s anxiety about the pace of change in the non-European world
was not restricted to South Africa. In December , after considerable debate,
the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution on colonialism sponsored by
forty-three countries on the initiative of the Afro-Asian group in the UN.
Despite reservations about the text, the US Mission to the United Nations and
the State Department had decided to vote for the resolution. It was a decision
with which Eisenhower initially concurred, though he expressed serious res-
ervations about the document. But upon receipt of a letter from British Prime
Minister Macmillan expressing his shock that the United States was prepared
Congress, an act considered “unfriendly” by the South African government. See Embassy in South
Africa tel. to the Department of State,  June , ibid., –.
. Memorandum of conversation,  March , ibid., –. The president “said that he
would agree with such a procedure. He had strong feelings that one could not sit in judgment on
a difficult social and political problem six thousand miles away. He had to say that our own problem
was in his mind in this connection, and that he had some sympathy even with his friends in Atlanta
on some of their difficulties. He suggested that a UN resolution could perhaps just express regret
about the disturbances in South Africa and hope that measures would be taken to prevent their
recurrence.”
. Even though Eisenhower’s reactions betrayed his personal predilection for siding with the
white-minority government in South Africa, it had become evident since Little Rock that the
United  States would publicly continue to dissociate itself in the United Nations from the
apartheid policies in South Africa. The South African foreign minister was informed at a meeting
in the Department of State with Secretary Herter, in response to the foreign minister’s reiteration
of his government’s unhappiness with the statement on the Sharpeville incident and U.S. votes in
the United Nations against South Africa’s racial policy, that the United States hoped “real progress
can be made in ameliorating racial conditions in  the Union. While  we  have always fully
appreciated the difficulties of the problem, we cannot support South Africa’s official racial policy.”
Memorandum of conversation,  October , ibid., –.
to support the resolution and asking the United States to join Britain in
abstaining on the vote, Eisenhower reversed himself and instructed the State
Department to abstain. In addition, he requested the State Department to
approach certain African delegations at the UN with a view to persuading them
to abstain on the resolution. That request was a measure of Eisenhower’s
hubris on the issue of colonialism.
It was a decision that was not easily accepted by the American delegation to
the United Nations General Assembly. American Ambassador James
Wadsworth at the United Nations stated for the record and personally to Herter
that he was “shocked and disheartened” bythe decision to abstain. Wadsworth
believed that since the United States had already informed its Asian allies, the
Philippines and Japan, of its decision to back the resolution, any change would
be interpreted as evidence of American support for its colonial partners. A
black member of the American delegation to the United Nations, the sociologist
and opera singer Zelma Watson George, stood and applauded the adoption of
the resolution by the General Assembly and later said that she was of the view
that “no one in the delegation supported the abstention.” Her action caused a
stir among the delegates but she indicated that she felt an obligation to show
her opposition to the American abstention and was glad that she had acted in
accord with her feelings. The willingness of the American representatives at
the UN to signal their disapproval of the decision taken by Eisenhower revealed
the gap between the president and others involved in shaping American foreign
policy. Eisenhower’s hubris appeared to flow from his failure to acknowledge
that American aspirations for leadership in the international arena required the
ability to fashion effective coalitions with other states. On the issues of South
Africa and colonialism, Eisenhower betrayed his lack of contact with the
shifting climate of international and domestic opinion.
. Editorial note, ibid. :–.
. Mission at the United Nations tel. to the Department of State,  December , ibid.,
. The final vote was  to , with the United States joining Australia, Belgium, Britain, the
Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa in abstaining. Only the Dominican
Republic was not a colonial power and it was the only Latin American state that did not support
the resolution.
. Ibid. Wadsworth emphasized that: “It is also particularly unfortunate this last minute
reversal was made after Department informed Tokyo and Manila we would support this resolu-
tion; it seems inescapable that word will spread that our vote on this issue, of critical importance
to Asians and Africans, was determined by wishes of colonial powers which even we recognize as
such.”
. The New York Times,  December . The newspaper reported that “Mrs. George’s action
reminded delegates of a similar move made two years ago by Marian Anderson, another noted
Negro, while serving with the United States delegation. After voting against a motion to call a
special session of the Assembly to study the Cameroons, Miss Anderson made it clear that she was
“a member of an instructed delegation, and we are here to carry out what is wanted.”
. The irony of Eisenhower’s instruction for the United States to abstain on the vote was that
it followed upon an apology issued by Eisenhower himself to Michel Gallin-Douathe, the Central
African Republic representative to the UN, for an incident in Baltimore where he was refused
service in a restaurant. Gallin-Douathe had gone to Washington to present his credentials to
The divergences within the administration over the Sharpeville crisis and
the UN resolution on colonialism underscored the state of flux that had
overcome American policy. Prior to the Little Rock episode, the Eisenhower
administration had assumed that it could afford to ignore international critiques
of American race relations and even help South Africa to insulate itself from
international condemnation of its apartheid policies. The sanguine dismissal
of international opinion proved to be of limited duration, as the Little Rock
crisis shattered the notion that America was immune to criticism. Debates
Eisenhower and was on his way back to New York when the incident occurred. The United States
Mission to the United Nations recommended that there should be an apology from the president.
It reported that the story was circulating among the representatives of the African countries, and
that the Guineans and Ghanaians were “making [a] special point in conversations with African
colleagues of citing this case as proof [that] America is a nation of racists.” The mission saw the
presidential apology as a way of defusing the potential problems for American relations with the
African states raised by the incident. Eisenhower sent an apology deploring the incident and
assuring Gallin-Douathe that the United States would continue its efforts to eliminate the causes
of such incidents. The letter concluded: “The United States attaches great importance to the
friendship of the African people. I hope you will judge this regrettable incident, which reflects the
attitude of only a minority of the citizens of this country, in its proper perspective.” Editorial note,
which contains excerpts of the documents pertaining to the issue, FRUS, – :–.
. Michael Krenn has shown the ways in which even the administration’s propaganda efforts
fell victim to that state of flux. See Michael L. Krenn, “Segregation and the  World’s Fair,”
Diplomatic History  (Fall ): –.
“I THINK THIS IS A RATHER SAD SORT OF THING”. From: Straight Herblock (Simon &
Shuster, ).
within the administration about race and colonialism after Little Rock reflected
a sense of siege in dealing with the manifest volatility of the challenge to the
notion of white/European supremacy. There was a growing realization that
America was as much part of the problem as its European partners and that its
leadership role would be seriously compromised if it did not become part of
the solution. Unfortunately, the Eisenhower administration proved to be unable
to mount the necessary effort to devise a legitimate solution to the problems of
race within the United States and internationally. The ambivalence that Eisen-
hower betrayed on issues of race in foreign policy paralleled his handling of
the Little Rock crisis – he was profoundly uneasy about acknowledging the
legitimacy of claims of people of color when faced by intransigent whites.
Even as he was willing to make an effort to redress wrongs inflicted upon
individual African diplomatic representatives by Americans, he seemed unable
to understand the broader challenge to colonialism and apartheid by people of
color. His role in shaping the American response to these issues revealed the
extent to which his personal influence helped to define American foreign policy.
Nonetheless, international scrutiny and criticism of American society had
created a climate in which Eisenhower appeared increasingly to be an anach-
ronism. The changed international context opened the way for the emergence
of the Kennedy administration with its promise of a new beginning in American
policy toward European colonialism and the domestic politics of race.
. A vivid example of this tendency was exemplified by Eisenhower’s resistance to appeals
to intervene, even if symbolically, in the situation in New Orleans in November  where white
protesters had mounted a vigorous campaign against the desegregation of the schools. Ward
Melville, who had served as a trustee of Columbia University when Eisenhower was president of
that institution, sent a note to the president in November  suggesting that Eisenhower should
speak out on “this New Orleans integration matter.” He attached a letter to the editor of the New
York Times that argued “how fitting it would be for the President, by deed or word, to pay tribute
to these Negro kids, their parents, friends and counterparts who unquestionably represent the
highest expression of the spirit, the courage, the moral dedication that have taken America so far.
As a lame-duck President there are no votes to win or lose; there is no one to impugn his motive.
All that is necessary is the belief and the desire.” Ward Melville to Eisenhower,  November ,
Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF -A--A, box . Eisenhower sent a non-committal
response that “any statement or action respecting this delicate situation must be very carefully
weighed both as to content and timing. I appreciate your feeling and, of course, will stay in
continuous close touch with the developing situation.” Eisenhower to Melville,  November ,
Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF -A--A, box . A similar appeal from Senator Jacob
Javits of New York received an equally non-committal response. Eisenhower Papers, Central Files,
OF -A--A, box .
. As Robert MacMahon has argued, it is not possible to provide a thorough evaluation of
Eisenhower as a president without assessing his policy toward the rise of non-European nation-
alism. I would only add that non-European nationalism and civil rights are two sides of the same
coin when such an assessment is contemplated. See Robert J. MacMahon, “Eisenhower and Third
World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” Political Science Quarterly , no.  (): –.
